A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks'franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) contradict this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer projects, so they will in turn be safer. However, this result does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from non-defaulting loans. This paper shows that when this e¤ect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.
Introduction
There is a large theoretical literature that shows that competition reduces banks'franchise values and induces them to take more risk.
1 A key assumption in this literature is that banks invest in assets with exogenous distributions of returns. A recent paper by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) replaces this by the assumption that banks invest in loans. Following the seminal paper on credit rationing by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , they also assume that the risk of these loans is increasing in the loan interest rate. Hence a reduction in loan rates due to greater bank competition reduces the loans'probability of default. They also assume that loan defaults are perfectly correlated, in which case the loans'probability of default coincides with the bank's probability of failure. Hence they conclude that competition reduces the risk of bank failure.
However, this result does not necessarily hold in the (arguably more realistic) case of imperfect correlation of loan defaults, because then greater bank competition also reduces the interest payments from non-defaulting loans, that provide a bu¤er to cover loan losses.
Thus in addition to the risk-shifting e¤ect there is a margin e¤ect that goes in the opposite direction, so the …nal e¤ect on the risk of bank failure is ambiguous.
Our setup is identical to that of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) , except for the introduction of imperfect correlation in loan defaults. Speci…cally, we use a static Cournot model of competition in a market for entrepreneurial loans in which the probability of default of these loans is privately chosen by the entrepreneurs. To model imperfect default correlation, we use the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002) , 2 according to which the default of an individual loan is driven by the realization of two risk factors: A systematic risk factor that is common to all loans, and an idiosyncratic risk factor. When the weight of the systematic risk factor is zero we have statistically independent defaults, and when the weight of the idiosyncratic risk factor is zero we have perfectly correlated defaults.
We show that the result in Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) is not robust to the introduction of even a small deviation from perfect correlation in loan defaults. Speci…cally, when the number of banks is su¢ ciently large, the risk-shifting e¤ect is always dominated by the margin e¤ect, so any additional entry would increase the risk of bank failure.
In less competitive loan markets the e¤ect is ambiguous, so we resort to numerical solutions for simple parameterizations of the model. We show that in general there is a U-shaped relationship between competition (measured by the number of banks) and the risk of bank failure. In other words, in very concentrated markets the risk-shifting e¤ect dominates, so entry reduces the probability of bank failure, whereas in very competitive markets the margin e¤ect dominates, so further entry increases the probability of failure.
To check the robustness of these results we …rst consider a dynamic version of the Cournot model of competition in the loan market, in which banks that do not fail in one period have the opportunity to lend to a new set of entrepreneurs in the next period: This generates an endogenous franchise value that is lost upon failure, so banks have an incentive to be prudent. We show that the same U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure obtains. We also show that the introduction of franchise values enhances bank stability (relative to the static setup), except in the case in which the number of banks is the one that minimizes the probability of failure, where it has no e¤ect. Finally, the same results (both static and dynamic) obtain when the Cournot model is replaced by a circular road model of competition in the loan market. The fact that the results are robust to the change of strategic variable from quantities to prices suggests that they are likely to hold for a wide set of model of imperfect competition. Hence the conclusion is that when loan defaults are imperfectly correlated the probability of bank failure is lowest in loan markets with moderate levels of competition, with higher probabilities of failure in either very competitive or very monopolistic markets.
To simplify the presentation, and in contrast with Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) , we abstract from competition in the deposit market by assuming that banks face a perfectly elastic supply of (fully insured) deposits at an interest rate that is normalized to zero. In models where banks invest in assets with exogenous distributions of returns imperfect competition can only be introduced in the deposit market, but in models where banks face a downward-sloping demand for loans this is no longer necessary. It should be noted that our results are robust to the introduction of an upward-sloping supply of deposits. Indeed, it is the case that the margin e¤ect that we have identi…ed is stronger in such a model, so a smaller number of banks would minimize the risk of bank failure.
The assumption that deposits are fully insured is also made to simplify the presentation.
In the absence of deposit insurance, and assuming that depositors are risk-neutral, the deposit rate would be determined in equilibrium by the condition that the expected return of bank deposits equals the risk-free rate.
3 Hence uninsured deposit rates would be increasing in the risk of bank failure, but our results would be essentially unchanged.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model of Cournot competition with imperfectly correlated defaults. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the model, and analyzes the e¤ect of an increase in the number of banks on loan rates and probabilities of bank failure. Section 4 presents the numerical results on the U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. Section 5 shows that these results also obtain in a dynamic version of the Cournot model with endogenous franchise values, and in a circular road model of competition in the loan market. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1) and three classes of risk-neutral agents:
entrepreneurs, banks, and depositors.
Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of penniless entrepreneurs characterized by a continuous distribution of reservation utilities with support R + . Let G(u) denote the measure of entrepreneurs that have reservation utility less than or equal to u:
Each entrepreneur i has a project that requires a unit investment at date 0; and yields a 3 See Repullo (2005) for a model of information-based bank runs with endogenous uninsured deposit rates.
stochastic payo¤ at date 1
with probability 1 p i with probability p i where the probability of failure p i 2 [0; 1] is privately chosen by the entrepreneur at date 0:
Following Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8) we assume that the success return of the project (p i ) is positive and increasing in p i . Thus riskier projects have a higher success return. In order to get interior solutions to the entrepreneur's choice of risk we also assume that (p i )
is concave with (0) < 0 (0): The project's loss given failure is positive and smaller than one, and to simplify the presentation we assume that it does not depend on p i .
To fund their projects entrepreneurs borrow from banks. For any given loan rate r; entrepreneur i will choose p i in order to maximize its expected payo¤ from undertaking the project, which is the success return net of the interest payment, (p i ) r; times the probability of success,
denote the maximum expected payo¤ that an entrepreneur can obtain when the loan rate is r: Since entrepreneurs only di¤er in their reservation utilities, the solution p(r) to this problem and hence u(r) do not depend on i: Moreover for (0) 0 (0) < r < (1) the solution p(r) will be interior 5 and characterized by the …rst-order condition
Hence by the envelope theorem we have u 0 (r) = (1 p) < 0: Also, since 00 ( ) 0 and 0 ( ) > 0; di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition we get
4 With probability p i the project fails, in which case by limited liability the entrepreneur gets a zero payo¤, and the bank recovers 1 : 5 The corner p = 0 cannot be a solution if 0 (0) (0) + r > 0; which gives (0) 0 (0) < r; while the corner p = 1 cannot be a solution if
(1) + r < 0; which gives r < (1):
Thus the higher the loan rate the higher the probability of failure chosen by the entrepreneurs.
The positive e¤ect of loan rates on entrepreneurs'optimal choice of risk will be called the risk-shifting e¤ect.
Entrepreneur i will want to undertake her project when the loan rate is r if her reservation utility u i is smaller than or equal to u(r): Hence the measure of entrepreneurs that want to borrow from the banks at the rate r is given by G(u(r)): Since each one requires a unit loan, the loan demand function is L(r) = G(u(r)):
the corresponding inverse loan demand function.
In contrast with Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) , we assume that project failures and consequently loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. We use the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002) , according to which the outcome of the project of entrepreneur i is driven by the realization of a random variable
where ( ) denotes the cdf of a standard normal random variable and 1 ( ) its inverse, z is a systematic risk factor that a¤ects all projects, " i is an idiosyncratic risk factor that only a¤ects the project of entrepreneur i; and 2 [0; 1] is a parameter that determines the extent of correlation in project failures. It is assumed that z and " i are standard normal random variables, independently distributed from each other as well as, in the case of " i ; across projects.
The project of entrepreneur i fails when y i < 0: The deterministic term 1 (p i ) in (1) ensures that the probability of failure satis…es
Notice that for = 0 the systematic risk factor does not play any role and we have statistically independent failures, while for = 1 the idiosyncratic risk factor does not play any role and we have perfectly correlated failures. In what follows we focus on the imperfect correlation case 2 (0; 1):
Consider now the continuum of entrepreneurs that want to undertake their projects when the loan rate is r: By our previous argument they all choose the same probability of failure p = p(r): But then the aggregate failure rate x (the fraction of projects that fail) is only a function of the realization of the systematic risk factor z: Speci…cally, by the law of large numbers, the failure rate x coincides with the probability of failure of a (representative) project i conditional on the realization of z:
Hence using the fact that z N (0; 1); the cdf of the failure rate is
For 2 (0; 1) the cdf F (x) is continuous and increasing, with lim x!0 F (x) = 0 and
so changes in the probability of failure p lead to a …rst-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of the failure rate x; and @F=@ 0 if and only if x ( p 1 1 (p)); so changes in the correlation parameter lead to a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the failure rate x: Note also that when ! 0 (independent failures) the distribution of the failure rate approaches the limit F (x) = 0; for x < p; and F (x) = 1; for x p: The single mass point at x = p implies that a fraction p of the projects fail with probability 1: And when ! 1 (perfectly correlated failures) the distribution of the failure rate approaches the
implies that with probability 1 p no project fails, and the mass point at x = 1 implies that with probability p all projects fail.
Banks
There are n identical banks that at date 0 are funded with fully insured deposits, have no capital, and invest in a portfolio of entrepreneurial loans. The supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at an interest rate that is normalized to zero, and there are no intermediation costs.
Following Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) we assume that banks compete for loans à la Cournot, so the strategic variable of bank j = 1; :::; n is its supply of loans l j : The aggregate supply of loans L = P n j=1 l j determines the loan rate r(L), which in turn determines the probability of failure chosen by the entrepreneurs p(r(L)):
The return of bank j's portfolio is stochastic: a random fraction x of its loans default, in which case the bank loses the interest r as well as a fraction of the principal. Thus the bank gets l j (1 + r) from the fraction 1 x of the loans that do not default, recovers l j (1 )
from the fraction x of defaulted loans, and has to pay back l j to the depositors, so its payo¤ at date 1 is
The bank fails when r (r + )x < 0, that is when the default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy default rate
Hence, by limited liability, bank j's objective function is
where l j denotes the vector of loan supplies of the other n 1 banks, and the distribution function of the default rate is written so as to keep track of the e¤ect of the (endogenous) probability of default of the loans. Thus when choosing its supply of loans l j ; bank j takes into account the direct e¤ect on the loan rate r(L); as well as the indirect e¤ect on the probability of default of the loans p(r(L)) and hence on the probability distribution of the default rate x.
Equilibrium
This section characterizes the Cournot-Nash (symmetric) equilibrium of our model of competition in the loan market, and analyzes the e¤ect of an increase in the number of banks on equilibrium loan rates and equilibrium probabilities of bank failure.
Integrating by parts, the banks'objective function (4) can be written more compactly as
where
is the banks'expected payo¤ per unit of loans.
In what follows we are going to assume that functional forms and parameter values are such that h 0 (L) < 0 and h 00 (L) < 0; so there is a unique symmetric equilibrium characterized by the …rst-order condition
It should be noted that these assumptions are stronger than the assumption that the inverse loan demand function r(L) is decreasing and concave. To see this observe that
so the …rst term is negative. The sign of the integral is however ambiguous, because F (x; p(r(L))) > 0; while @F=@p < 0 (the …rst-order stochastic dominance e¤ect on the probability distribution of the default rate) and p 0 (r) > 0 (the risk-shifting e¤ect). To understand the source of the ambiguity consider the simple case with = 1 (perfectly correlated defaults)
for which F (x; p) = 1 p for 0 < x < 1; so by (3) and (5) we have
The …rst term in this expression is the standard negative one: Higher aggregate loans reduce the banks' expected payo¤ per unit of loans. The second term is however positive, re ‡ecting the working of the risk-shifting e¤ect: Lower loan rates increase the probability of 6 Note that in this model h(L) plays the role of the inverse demand function in a standard Cournot model. The simple proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium may be found in Tirole (1988, p. 225). loan repayment and hence increase the banks'expected payo¤ per unit of loans. So to get h 0 (L) < 0 the risk-shifting e¤ect must not be very large. 7 A similar argument applies for the assumption h 00 (L) < 0:
The e¤ects of competition on equilibrium aggregate lending and loan rates are stated in the following result.
Proposition 1 An increase in the number of banks n increases equilibrium aggregate lending L and consequently reduces the equilibrium loan rate r.
Proof Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition (6) and using the assumptions h 0 (L) < 0 and
Proposition 1 implies that the higher the competition among banks the lower the probability of default of the loans in their portfolios. However, this does not necessarily imply a reduction in the banks'probability of failure. To see this observe that banks fail whenever the default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy default rate b x(L) de…ned in (3). Using the probability distribution of the default rate (2), the probability of bank failure is given by
Hence we have dq dn = q 0 (L) dL dn Since dL=dn > 0 by Proposition 1, it follows that higher competition leads to lower risk of bank failure if and only if the slope of the function q(L) is negative. Now di¤erentiating (7) we get
7 For example, for small probabilities of default and r = 4% we would need p 0 (r) to be smaller than, approximately, 1=0:04 = 25: This condition is very likely to be satis…ed: an increase of 100 basis points in the loan rate r should not lead to an increase of 2,500 basis points in the probability of default p.
Since 0 ( ) > 0 (it is a normal density), the sign of q 0 (L) is the same as the sign of the term in square brackets, which has two components. The …rst one is negative, since d 1 ( )=dp > 0; p 0 (r) > 0; and r 0 (L) < 0; while the second one is positive (whenever < 1), since
The negative e¤ect is the risk-shifting e¤ect identi…ed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) : More competition leads lower loan rates, which in turn lead to lower probabilities of default, and hence safer banks. The positive e¤ect is what may be called the margin e¤ect: More competition leads to lower loan rates, and consequently lower revenues from non-defaulting loans, which provide a bu¤er against loan losses, so we have riskier banks. Depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates, the impact of competition on the risk of bank failure may be positive or negative.
A few special cases are worth mentioning. When = 1 (perfectly correlated defaults) the margin e¤ect disappears, 8 so we get the result in Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) : Competition always reduces the risk of bank failure. When = 0 (independent defaults) the default rate is deterministic (a fraction p of the loans default with probability 1), 9 in which case it is easy to show that for any number of banks the probability of failure is zero. And when p 0 (r) = 0 the risk-shifting e¤ect disappears, so competition always increases the risk of bank failure.
For 0 < < 1 and p 0 (r) > 0 the result is in general ambiguous. However one can show that that the margin e¤ect dominates in very competitive markets.
Proposition 2 For any correlation parameter 2 (0; 1); when the number of banks n is su¢ ciently large additional increases in n increase the probability of bank failure q.
Proof When n tends to in…nity the …rst-order condition (6) that characterizes the Cournot equilibrium becomes h(L) = 0; which by (5) implies b x(L) = 0 and hence r(L) = 0: Thus in very competitive markets the loan rate approaches the deposit rate, which has been normalized to zero. But then we have
= 0 we have F (x; p) = 0; for x < p; and F (x; p) = 1; for x p, so (3) and (5) 
and we have lim n!1 p(r(L)) = p(0) > 0; by assumption (0) < 0 (0); which implies
Hence by (8) we have q 0 (L) > 0 for su¢ ciently large n, which implies dq=dn > 0:
Proposition 2 shows that the result in Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) is not robust to the introduction of even a small deviation from perfect correlation in loan defaults. Speci…cally, in very competitive loan markets the risk-shifting e¤ect is always dominated by the margin e¤ect, so any additional entry would increase the risk of bank failure. The intuition for this result is that as we get close to perfect competition the margin between loan and deposit rates converges to zero. But since the probability of default of the loans is bounded away from zero (and banks have no capital bu¤er), in the limit the loan losses will be greater than the intermediation margin, so banks will fail with probability 1: The open question is what happens in less competitive loan markets. To answer this question we will resort to numerical solutions for simple parameterizations of the model.
Numerical Results
This section computes the equilibrium of the model of competition in the loan market for a simple parameterization in which the demand for loans L(r) (and hence the inverse demand for loans r(L)) is linear, and the risk-shifting function p(r) is also linear. We compute the equilibrium of the model for di¤erent values of the number of banks n; and examine how the probability of bank failure q changes with n:
The critical parameters that determine the shape of the relationship between q and n are the correlation parameter and the risk-shifting parameter b = p 0 (r): By the results in Section 3 we know that q is decreasing in n when ! 1 (the case of perfectly correlated defaults), and it is increasing in n when b ! 0 (the case of no entrepreneurial risk-shifting).
By Proposition 2 we also know that the relationship is increasing for su¢ ciently large n: 
In this setup, parameter a is the minimum probability of default of a project (that is, the probability of default that would be chosen by the entrepreneurs for a zero loan rate), and the ratio c=d is the maximum demand for loans (that corresponds to a zero loan rate).
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In our benchmark parameterization we take a = 0:01; b = 0:5; c = 1; and d = 0:01: This means that the demand for loans goes from 100 to 0 as loan rates go from 0% to 100%, and that the probability of default that corresponds to a loan rate of 2% is 2%. The loss given default parameter is set at 0:45; and the correlation parameter is set at 0:2. 13 It should be noted that these parameters are chosen for the purpose of illustrating the possible shapes of the relationship between the number of banks and the risk of bank failure. They are not intended to produce realistic values of variables such as the loan rate r, the probability of loan default p; or the probability of bank failure q: Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of banks n (expressed in log 10 n) and the probability of bank failure q for three di¤erent values of the correlation parameter, 11 Since L(r) = G(u(r)); one can show that (9) and (10) also imply G(u) = (a + bc 1 + p 2bu)=bd: 12 Since we have normalized to zero the interest rate on (fully insured) deposits, loan rates should be interpreted as spreads over a risk-free rate. 13 The value of is the one speci…ed in the Internal Ratings-Based formula (foundation approach) of Basel II for senior claims on corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures not secured by recognized collateral. The value of for these exposures ranges from 0.12 to 0.24. = 0; 0.2, and 1, with the other parameters at their benchmark levels. As noted in the previous section, with independent defaults ( = 0) banks never fail (q = 0), because the (deterministic) interest income per unit of loans, (1 p(r(L)))r(L); is greater than the (deterministic) loan losses per unit of loans, p(r(L)) : With perfectly correlated defaults ( = 1) the probability of bank failure is decreasing in the number of banks, which is the result in Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) . Interestingly, when = 0:2 we have a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure, with a minimum q for n = 3:
Figure1. Relationship between the number of banks and the probability of bank failure in the Cournot model for di¤erent values of the correlation parameter Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of banks n (expressed in log 10 n) and the probability of bank failure q for three di¤erent values of the risk-shifting parameter, b = 0; 0.5, and 1, with the other parameters at their benchmark levels. As noted in the previous section, when b = 0 the risk-shifting e¤ect disappears, so the margin e¤ect makes the probability of bank failure increasing in the number of banks. For b = 0:5 we have the same U-shaped relationship already depicted in Figure 1 . For higher values of the riskshifting parameter, such as b = 1; the risk-shifting e¤ect becomes stronger, but the slope of the relationship eventually becomes positive (in this case for n = 10): In all these cases, as we get close to perfect competition the probability of bank failure converges to one. By Proposition 2, this is because when n tends to in…nity the margin between loan and deposit rates converges to zero, but with 2 (0; 1) and p(0) = a > 0 the loan losses are be positive with probability one, which gives the result. It turns out that the U-shaped relationship between the number of banks n and the probability of bank failure q obtains for a very large set of parameter values. Let n denote the number of banks that minimize q. When the actual number of banks n is below (above) the corresponding n , more (less) competition would reduce the probability of bank failure. Figure 3 illustrates the way in the correlation parameter and the risk-shifting parameter b determine n : Speci…cally, it shows the combinations of and b for which n = 1; 2; 3; :::.
One can see that for low values of or low values of b we have n = 1; so a monopolistic bank would minimize the probability of failure. Increases in either or b tend to increase n ; which reaches values greater than 100 when ! 1, i.e., in the Boyd and De Nicolò case. 
Extensions
This section analyzes two extensions of our model. First we consider a dynamic version of the Cournot model of competition in the loan market in which banks that do not fail at any date t have the opportunity to lend to a new set of entrepreneurs at date t + 1: This generates an endogenous franchise value that is lost upon failure, so banks have an incentive to be prudent. The second extension is to replace the Cournot model by a circular road model of competition in the loan market. In both extensions our previous results on the relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure remain unchanged.
A dynamic Cournot model
Consider a discrete time, in…nite horizon model with n identical banks that at each date t = 0; 1; 2; ::: in which they are open raise fully insured deposits at an interest rate that is normalized to zero in order to compete à la Cournot for loans to the continuum of entrepreneurs described in Section 2.1.
Assuming that banks are closed whenever the default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy default rate b
x(L) de…ned in (3), 14 the Bellman equation that characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the dynamic model is
where < 1 is the bank shareholders'discount factor, h(L) is the banks'expected pro…ts per unit of loans given by (5), and q(L) is the probability of bank failure given by (7). 15 According to this expression, the franchise value of a bank that is open results from maximizing with respect to its supply of loans l j (taking as given the supplies of the other n 1 banks l j that jointly determine the aggregate supply of loans L) an objective function that has two terms: The …rst one is the discounted expected payo¤ from current lending, l j h(L); and the second one is the discounted expected payo¤ of remaining open at the following date, which is the product of the probability of survival (one minus the probability of failure q(L)) and the franchise value V j : 16 Solving the Bellman equation (12) and setting l j = L=n gives the symmetric equilibrium aggregate lending L as well as the banks'equilibrium franchise value V (the same for all j).
In what follows we are going to assume that functional forms and parameter values are such that the dynamic model has a unique equilibrium for all n: Then the relationship between the static and the dynamic equilibrium is stated in the following result.
14 See Elizalde and Repullo (2007) for a discussion of alternative closure rules. 15 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 4) for a proof that one-stage-deviations are su¢ cient to characterize subgame perfect equilibria. 16 It should be noted that with a single systematic risk factor when one bank fails all of them fail, so there is no need to consider situations, like those in Perotti and Suarez (2002) , where one bank may survive while other fail, so the surviving bank may increase its market power in the following period.
Proposition 3 Let L s and L d denote equilibrium aggregate lending in the static and the dynamic model, respectively, for a given number of banks n.
Proof The …rst-order condition (6) that characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the static model is
and di¤erentiating (12) we get the …rst-order condition that characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the dynamic model
The second and third results are proved in the same manner.
The result in Proposition 3 shows that there is one case, namely when q 0 (L d ) = 0; in which aggregate lending, and consequently the probability of bank failure, are the same in the static and in the dynamic model. In all other cases we know the e¤ect on aggregate lending, but to establish the e¤ect on the probability of bank failure we need to make some assumption on the form of the function q(L): By the argument in Proposition 2, for any correlation parameter 2 (0; 1); q(L) is increasing for values of L approaching the perfect competition limit for which r(L) = 0, but away from this limit its shape depends on the speci…c forms of the inverse loan demand function r(L) and the entrepreneurial risk-shifting function p(r): Assuming that q(L) is U-shaped, Proposition 3 implies that when the number
and when the number of banks This result is illustrated in Figure 4 for our benchmark parameterization and = 0:96
(for which the function q(L) is indeed U-shaped). It shows the relationship between the number of banks n and the probability of bank failure q in the static and in the dynamic model. In both cases the relationship is U-shaped, with the curve for the static model everywhere above the curve for the dynamic model, except at the minimum in which the two curves are tangent. The two curves are also tangent when n tends to in…nity, because as we approach perfect competition the equilibrium franchise value V tends to zero, so the banks' objective function in the dynamic model coincides with their objective function in the static model. 
A circular road model
We now examine the robustness of our results to changes in the nature of competition among banks. Speci…cally, we consider Salop's (1979) circular road model of price competition.
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There are n 2 banks located symmetrically on a circumference of unit length, and a continuum of measure 1 of entrepreneurs distributed uniformly on this circumference. We focus on the static version of the model, since the results for the dynamic version are similar to those obtained for the Cournot model.
Entrepreneurs have the investment projects described in Section 2.1. They are ex-ante identical except for their location on the circumference, and they have a zero reservation utility. To fund their projects they have to travel to a bank, which involves a transport cost per unit of distance.
To obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the model of spatial competition we …rst compute the demand for loans of bank j when it o¤ers a loan rate r j while the remaining n 1 banks o¤er the rate r: Assuming that the transport cost is not too high, the market will be "totally covered,"and bank j will have two e¤ective competitors, namely banks j 1 and j + 1: An entrepreneur located at distance z from bank j and distance 1=n z from bank j + 1 will be indi¤erent between borrowing from j and borrowing from j + 1 if her utility net of transport costs is the same, that is, if
Solving for z in this equation yields
so taking into account the symmetric market area between bank j and bank j 1 gives the following demand for loans of bank j l(r j ; r) = 1 n + u(r j ) u(r)
Notice that for r j = r we have u(r j ) = u(r), so z(r; r) = 1=2n; i.e., the mid point between two adjacent banks. In this case l(r; r) = 1=n; so banks would be equally sharing the unit mass of borrowers. Since we have shown that u 0 ( ) < 0; it follows that the demand function l(r j ; r) is decreasing in r j and increasing in r:
Assuming that the supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at an interest rate that is normalized to zero, and following the same steps as in Section 2.2, bank j's objective function is (r j ; r) = l(r j ; r)h(r j )
is the bank j's expected pro…ts per unit of loans, and b x(r j ) is bank j's bankruptcy default rate de…ned by
Hence the …rst-order condition that characterizes a symmetric equilibrium is
where l 1 (r j ; r) = @l=@r j :
In correspondence with the assumptions in Section 3, here we assume that functional forms and parameter values are such that h 0 (r) > 0; h 00 (r) < 0; and l 11 (r j ; r) = @ 2 l=@r 2 j < 0:
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We can then prove the following result.
Proposition 4 An increase in the number of banks n reduces the equilibrium loan rate r.
Proof Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition (15) and using l 1 (r; r) < 0 together with the assumptions h 0 (r) > 0; h 00 (r) < 0; and l 11 (r; r) < 0 gives dr dn = l 1 (r; r)h(r) h 00 (r) + nl 11 (r; r)h(r) + nl 1 (r; r)h 0 (r) < 0
18 As before, assuming that h 0 (r) > 0 and h 00 (r) < 0 requires that the risk-shifting e¤ect p 0 (r) must not be very large.
Proposition 4 implies that the higher the competition among banks the lower the probability of default of the loans in their portfolios. However, as in the case of the Cournot model, this does not imply a reduction in the banks'probability of failure. To see this observe that banks fail whenever the default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy default rate b x(r) in (14). Using the probability distribution of the default rate (2), the probability of bank failure is given by
Hence we have
Since dr=dn < 0 by Proposition 4, it follows that higher competition leads to lower risk of bank failure if and only if the slope of the function q(r) is positive.
Now di¤erentiating (16) we get
Since 0 ( ) > 0 (it is a normal density), the sign of q 0 (r) is the same as the sign of the term in square brackets, which has two components. The …rst one is positive, since d 1 ( )=dp > 0 and p 0 (r) > 0; while the second one is negative (whenever < 1), since d 1 ( )=dx > 0
and b x 0 (r) > 0: As in the model of Cournot competition, the …rst component captures the risk-shifting e¤ect: More competition leads lower loan rates, which in turn lead to lower probabilities of default, and hence safer banks. The second component captures the margin e¤ect: More competition leads to lower loan rates, and consequently lower revenues from non-defaulting loans, which provide a bu¤er against loan losses, so we have riskier banks.
Depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates, the impact of competition on the risk of bank failure may be positive or negative. But as in the Cournot model, one can show that when loan defaults are imperfectly correlated the margin e¤ect dominates in very competitive markets.
Proposition 5 For any correlation parameter 2 (0; 1); when the number of banks n is su¢ ciently large additional increases in n increase the probability of bank failure q.
Proof When n tends to in…nity the …rst-order condition (15) that characterizes the equilibrium becomes h(r) = 0; which by (13) implies b x(r) = 0 and hence r = 0: Thus in very competitive markets the loan rate approaches the deposit rate, which has been normalized to zero. But then we have
and we have lim n!1 p(r) = p(0) > 0; by assumption (0) < 0 (0); which implies
Hence by (17) we have q 0 (r) < 0 for su¢ ciently large n, which implies dq=dn > 0:
Proposition 5 shows that in very competitive loan markets the risk-shifting e¤ect is always dominated by the margin e¤ect, so any additional entry would increases the risk of bank failure. To illustrate what happens in less competitive markets we resort to numerical solutions for simple parameterizations of the model.
As in Section 4 we postulate the linear risk-shifting function p(r) = a + br; for which the the expected payo¤ function u(r) is given by (11). Hence demand for loans of bank j is l(r j ; r) = 1 n + 1 2b
(1 a br j )
2
(1 a br)
In our benchmark parameterization we set the minimum probability of default a = 0:01.
The loss given default parameter is = 0:45; the correlation parameter is = 0:2, and the transport cost parameter is = 1:
As in the case of the model with Cournot competition, we get a U-shaped relationship between the number of banks n and the probability of bank failure q. If we let n denote the number of banks that minimize the probability of failure, Figure 5 illustrates the way in the correlation parameter and the risk-shifting parameter b determine n : For low values of or low values of b we have n = 2; so a duopoly would minimize the probability of failure.
Increases in either or b tend to increase n ; which reaches values greater than 100 when ! 1, i.e., in the Boyd and De Nicolò case. Hence we conclude that our results remain unchanged when we replace the Cournot model by a circular road model of competition in the loan market. The fact that the results are robust to the change of strategic variable from quantities to prices suggests that they are likely to hold for a wide set of models of imperfect competition. The general conclusion is that when loan defaults are imperfectly correlated the probability of bank failure is lowest in loan markets with moderate levels of competition, with higher probabilities of failure in either very competitive or very monopolistic markets.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the e¤ects of increased competition on the risk of bank failure in the context of a model in which (1) banks invest in entrepreneurial loans, (2) the probability of default of these loans is endogenously chosen by the entrepreneurs, and (3) loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. We show that there are two opposite e¤ects. The risk-shifting e¤ect identi…ed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) follows from (1) and (2) and works as follows:
More competition leads lower loan rates, which in turn lead to lower probabilities of default, and hence safer banks. The margin e¤ect follows from (3) and works as follows: More competition leads to lower loan rates, and consequently lower revenues from non-defaulting loans, which provide a bu¤er against loan losses, so we have riskier banks. The results show that the risk-shifting e¤ect tends to dominate in monopolistic markets, whereas the margin e¤ect dominates in competitive markets, so a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.
These results could be tested empirically by regressing some measure of bank solvency (such as the Z-score 19 ) on the level and the square of some measure of concentration in the loan market (such as the Hirschmann-Her…ndahl index 20 or the Lerner index 21 ). According to the predictions of our model, the coe¢ cient of the linear term should be positive, and
that of the quadratic term should be negative. It should be noted that our results cannot be tested by choosing a non-performing commercial loans (NPL) ratio as a measure of bank risk, because NPL ratios only proxy the loans'probability of default, which according to the risk-shifting e¤ect should be increasing in any measure of concentration.
Although we have focus on the impact of changes in competition within the banking sector, the results could be easily extended to a situation in which the banking sector faces increased competition from …nancial markets. In particular, one could assume that the public debt markets can fund the entrepreneurial projects at an interest rate r > 0: This outside option truncates the loan demand function at the rate r: If the truncation is binding, the equilibrium loan rate would be r = r; so an increase in competition coming from the …nancial markets would lead to a reduction in equilibrium loan rates. As before, the e¤ect on the risk of bank failure would be the outcome of a negative risk-shifting e¤ect and a positive margin e¤ect.
The results could also be used to analyze the relationship between monetary and …nancial 19 The Z-score is de…ned as Z = (ROA + EA)= (ROA); where ROA is the rate of return on assets, EA is the ratio of equity to assets, and (ROA) is the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. This measure has been used by Boyd et al. (2006) . 20 The Hirschmann-Her…ndahl index is de…ned as the sum of the squares of the banks'market shares, that is HHI = P n j=1 (l j =L) 2 : This measure has been used by Boyd et al. (2006) . 21 The Lerner index is de…ned as L = (r M C)=r; where r is the average loan rate and M C is an estimate of the loans'marginal cost. This measure has been used by Jiménez et al. (2006) . stability, in particular the e¤ect of a tightening of monetary policy on the risk of bank failure.
For this we need to replace the deposit rate by a risk-free rate i; which proxies policy rate set by the central bank. In this case the banks'objective function in the static Cournot model becomes (l j ; l j ) = l j (h(L) i) so the …rst-order condition that characterizes the symmetric equilibrium is
From here it is immediate to get dL di = n Lh 00 (L) + (n + 1)h 0 (L) < 0 which implies dr=di > 0 and dp=di > 0; so we have riskier loans. Moreover one can show that the bankruptcy default rate is decreasing in i; so the margin e¤ect in this case reinforces the risk-shifting e¤ect. Hence we conclude that a tightening of monetary policy leads to an increase in the probability of bank failure. We plan to explore this issue in future research.
